Predicates
Predicates in logic are used to express properties of objects or relations between them. Again, properties and relations are meant here in a very loose sense, and their representation, in set theory, is very minimal in detail.
Predicates of 1-place
Suppose you want your
-place predicate
in
to express the property โis a physicistโ. We already introduced the concept of a domain of discourse, or domain,
about which our language should be about. So given our domain, how do we capture that
should have the meaning โis a physicistโ? Well, we can specify a subset of the domain
, letโs call it
, which consists of just the physicists in our domain. In set-builder notation, we can say:
here is a subset of the domain
, since by definition, every
is also in
. Moreover, it only includes those members of the domain that are physicists. That is, the set of physicists in the domain. This may be called the property โis a physicistโ, as we noted in the last chapter. Then, we can use the interpretation function to connect our
-place predicate to the property (subset of the domain).
Again, represented in a figure:
| -place predicates | Subsets of Domain (properties) | |
|---|---|---|
| -place predicate | set of things |
And in particular:
| -place predicates | Subsets of Domain (properties) | |
|---|---|---|
| (โis a physicistโ) |
Again, the meaning of our predicates can be anything, as long as it is a property in the domain, that is, a subset of things of the domain. For example, it can be the set of things (of the domain
) that are singers (the property of being a singer), the set of things that are numbers (the property of being a number), the set of things that are world wars (the property of being a world war), and so on. You can even have properties that only have one member, like โis the first female artist with four Top 10 albums at onceโ.
| -place predicates | Subsets of Domain (properties) | |
|---|---|---|
| (โis a physicistโ) | ||
| (โis a singerโ) | ||
| (โis a numberโ) | ||
| (โis a world warโ) | ||
Predicates of 2-places
The above approach takes care of our
-place predicates. But predicates can come with more places (the superscript for
). Suppose you want to assign meaning to a
-place predicate
, and in particular, you want it to mean โ
loves
โ. Here, a set will not do, since we want to capture a relation, not a property. In particular we want to capture that a person is in the relation of loving another person (or thing in general).
If you think back to our discussion of set theory, you already know how to do this. Instead of a set of objects, you can take a set of pairs here, that represents two objects of the domain standing in the loving relation. Once again, we may introduce a relation
on the domain, and specify it as such:
So
here is the set of pairs such that the first member of each pair loves the second member of that pair. So if our domain includes Julie and Jane, and Julie loves Jane, but Jane does not love Julie, we would have that
, but
. So again:
| -place predicates | Sets of Pairs of Domain (
-place relations) |
|
|---|---|---|
| -place predicate | pairs of things |
And in particular:
| -place predicates | Sets of Pairs of Domain (
-place relations) |
|
|---|---|---|
| (โlovesโ) |
Again, you can introduce whatever relation you want here, as long as it can be represented by a set of pairs of members of the domain. For example, โis the favorite number ofโ, โis a sibling ofโ, โstands 2 feet to the right ofโ, and so on. That is:
| -place predicates | Sets of Pairs of Domain (
-place relations) |
|
|---|---|---|
| (โlovesโ) | ||
| (โis the favorite number ofโ) | ||
| (โis a sibling ofโ) | ||
| (โstands 2 feet to the right ofโ) |
In each case,
,
,
,
are just sets of pairs representing all pairs of members of the domain that are in the specified relation.
Notice that each member of these binary relations have, either on the left or the right side, a member of
, the domain. By the Cartesian product of
with itself once, i.e.,
or
, we can get the set of all pairs of members of
. Now relations on
will be subsets of
, since each will be either the universal relation on
, the empty set, or somewhere in between. In the above example,
, but
, so
is a non-empty proper subset of
.
Note that it is very important to be clear about the directionality of a relation. For example, we may have a predicate with assigned meaning โlovesโ. But we may also have a predicate with assigned meaning โis loved byโ. Now, if the relation
is the relation โlovesโ, and
is the relation โis loved byโ, then each pair will be reversed relative to the other one. For example, if
, but
, then
, but
, since
loves
if, and only if,
is loved by
. That is, if Julie loves Jane but Jane does not love Julie, then Jane is loved by Julie but Julie is not loved by Jane.
Predicates of n-places
You may see a pattern here. Predicates of
-place (unary predicates) were interpreted as sets. Predicates of
-places (binary predicates) were interpreted as
-place relations. But of course, our language has predicates of every arity (every number of โplaceโ), and to each, we may want to attribute some meaning. Well, this is not hard to do, since for any
-place predicate, we can assign an
-place relation. The important thing is just that if a predicate is of form
, then its meaning must agree with
, so it has to be a set of
-tuples.
Exercise 4.2. Give a natural example of a
-place,
-place, and
-place relation.
If you need a refresher on relations in logic, go back to the chapter on ordered sets and relations.
Following our handy figure, we have:
| -place predicates | Sets of
-tuples of Domain ( -place relations) |
|
|---|---|---|
| -place predicate | set of
-tuples ( -place relation) |
Making it a bit more concrete, but still quite abstract, we have:
| -place predicates | Sets of
-tuples of Domain ( -place relations) |
|
|---|---|---|
We can then extend our interpretation function
to cover now not only constants, but predicates as well.
Definition 4.2. A domain (of discourse) is any set
. An interpretation function for the predicates of
, denoted by
, (relative to
) is a function
such that for each predicate
,
for some
(the Cartesian product of
taken
-times with itself).
In fact, we can put together our definition of an interpretation function for constants, and our definition of an interpretation function for predicates, into one definition. We can also introduce a new notion; structure. Structure is just a shorthand for what we have been saying over and over again; that when giving meaning to our expressions, we do it with an interpretation function
against the backdrop of a domain
. So a structure
is just a pair
where
is the domain, and
is the interpretation function under consideration. With this in hand, we can say:
Definition 4.3. A structure
is a pair
, where
is any set, and
is a function from the constants and predicates of
(i.e.,
) such that:
- if
is any constant of
,
, and;
- if
is any predicate of arity
(
-place predicate) of
,
, where
.
As you can see, logicians can say a lot of stuff in very few words. This may seem intimidating at first. But remember that all these terse definitions hide quite intuitive ideas. We spent some time pondering these ideas so that you can read and understand the definition above, and the nuances and niceties it expresses so elegantly. This also gives you a very important skill: to go further. In more advanced logic textbooks, you wonโt find such long explanations as we have given. But now you wonโt need them either!3
A brief return to our language specification
Indeed, now that we are familiar with a lot more machinery than before, we can give a definition of our language in a manner that is a lot more succint.
Definition 4.4. Let
be the alphabet of
, specified as before, and thought of as forming a set. In particular, let
and
, and such that:
-
, and;
-
.
The set of (well-formed) formulas of
is the smallest set
such that:
- if
is a predicate of arity
in
, and
are (not necessarily distinct) constants in
, then
, and is an atomic formula;
- if
and
are in
, then:
-
;
-
;
-
; and
-
.
-
Again, a few weeks ago, this may have seemed extremely cryptic and impossible to comprehend, but now you are familar with all the different ideas underlying this definition, and can understand its intended meaning.
In fact, when I was studying philosophy as an undergrad, I was reading papers from Russell, Quine, and others, and I really wanted to understand what they were saying. So I went and bought myself a book on semantics. I opened up the first page, and definitions not unlike 4.4 and 4.3 greeted me. Unlike you, I did not have a textbook like this, so I had no idea what was going on. Needless to say, my foray into semantics stopped right there, and did not continue for a few years.