20 Sextus Empiricus: Outlines of Skepticism
Sextus Empiricus: Outlines of Pyrronism
Translated, with Introduction and Commentary, by Benson Mates
Oxford University Press, New York Oxford 1996
Book I
1.The Main Difference between the Philosophies
When people search for something, the likely outcome is that either they find I
it or, not finding it, they accept that it cannot be found, or they continue to search.
So also in the case of what is sought in philosophy, I think, some people 2 have
claimed to have found the truth, others have asserted that it cannot be
apprehended, and others are still searching. Those who think that they have 3
found it are the Dogmatists, properly so called-for example, the followers of
Aristotle and Epicurus, the Stoics, and certain others. The followers of
Cleitomachus and Carneades, as well as other Academics, have asserted that it
cannot be apprehended. The Skeptics continue to search. Hence it is with 4 reason
that the main types of philosophy are thought to be three in number: the
Dogmatic, the Academic, and the Skeptic. Concerning the first two it will best
become others to speak; but concerning the Skeptic Way we shall now give an
outline account, stating in advance that as regards none of the things that we are
about to say do we firmly maintain that matters are absolutely as stated, but in
each instance we are simply reporting, like a chronicler, what now appears to us to
be the case.
2. The Accounts of Skepticism
One account of the Skeptic philosophy is called “general”; the other, “specific”.
5 In the general account we set forth the characteristic traits of Skepticism, stating
its basic idea, its origins, arguments, criterion and goal, as well as the modes of
epoché [suspension of judgment], and how we take the Skeptic statements, and
the distinction between Skepticism and the competing philosophies. In the
specific account we state objections to each part of so-called 6 “philosophy”. Let
us, then, first take up the general account, beginning the exposition with the
various terms for the Skeptic Way.
3. The Nomenclature of the Skeptic Way
The Skeptic Way is called Zetetic [“questioning”] from its activity in
questioning 7 and inquiring, Ephectic [“suspensive”] from the pathos that arises
concerning the subject of inquiry, Aporetic [inclined to aporiai”] either, as some
say, from its being puzzled and questioning about everything or from its being at a
loss as to whether to assent or dissent, and Pyrrhonean because it appears to us
that Pyrrho applied himself to Skepticism more vigorously and conspicuously
than his predecessors did.
4. What Skepticism Is
The Skeptic Way is a disposition to oppose phenomena and noumena to one 8
another in any way whatever, with the result that, owing to the equipollence
among the things and statements thus opposed, we are brought first to epoché
and then to ataraxia. We do not apply the term “disposition” in any subtle
sense, but simply as cognate with “to be disposed.” At this point we are taking as
phenomena the objects of sense perception, thus contrasting them with the
noumena. The phrase “in any way whatever” can modify both the word
“disposition” (so as to make us take that word in a plain sense, as we said) and the
phrase “to oppose phenomena and noumena”; for since we oppose these in various
ways – phenomena to phenomena, noumena to noumena, or alternando
phenomena to noumena, we say “in any way whatever” in order to include all
such oppositions. Or we can apply “in any way whatever” to “phenomena and
noumena,” in order that we may not have to inquire how the phenomena appear or
the noumena are thought, but may take these terms in 10 their plain senses. By
“opposed” statements we simply mean inconsistent ones, not necessarily
affirmative and negative. By “equipollence” we mean equality as regards
credibility and the lack of it, that is, that no one of the inconsistent statements
takes precedence over any other as being more credible. Epoché is a state of the
intellect on account of which we neither deny nor affirm anything. Ataraxia is an
untroubled and tranquil condition of the soul. In our remarks on the goal of
Skepticism we shall come back to the question of how ataraxia enters the soul
along with epoché.
5. The Skeptic
The definition of the Pyrrhonean philosopher is implicitly contained in that
of the Skeptic Way: he is the person who has the aforementioned disposition.
6. The Origins of Skepticism
We say that the causal origin of the Skeptic Way is the hope of attaining
ataraxia. Certain talented people, upset by anomaly in “the facts” and at a loss as
to which of these “facts” deserve assent, endeavoured to discover what is true in
them and what is false, expecting that by settling this they would achieve
ataraxia. But the main origin of Skepticism is the practice of opposing to each
statement an equal statement; it seems to us that doing this brings an end to
dogmatizing.
7. Does the Skeptic Dogmatize?
Then we say that the Skeptic does not dogmatize we are not using the term
“dogma” as some do, in its more common meaning, “something that one merely
agrees to”, for the Skeptic does give assent to the pathé that are forced upon him
by a phantasia; for example, when feeling hot (or cold) he would not say “I seem
not to be hot (or cold).” But when we assert that he does not dogmatize, we use
“dogma” in the sense, which others give it, of assent to one of the non-evident
matters investigated by the sciences. For the Pyrrhonist 14 assents to nothing that
is non-evident. Not even in putting forward the Skeptic slogans about non-evident
things does he dogmatize – slogans like “Nothing *91* more” or “I determine
nothing” or any of the others of which we shall speak later. For the dogmatizer
propounds as certainty the things about which he is said to be dogmatizing, but
the Skeptic does not put forward these slogans as holding absolutely. He considers
that, just as the “All things are false” slogan says that together with the other
things it is itself false, as does the slogan “Nothing is true,” so also the “Nothing
more” slogan says that it itself is no more the case than its opposite, and thus it
applies to itself along with the rest. 15 We say the same of the other Skeptic
slogans. So that since the dogmatizer is one who posits the content of his dogmas
as being true, while the Skeptic presents his skeptical slogans as implicitly selfapplicable,
the Skeptic should not be said to dogmatize thereby. But the most
important point is that in putting forward these slogans he is saying what seems to
him to be the case and is reporting his pathos without belief, not firmly
maintaining anything concerning what exists externally.
8. Does the Skeptic Have a System?
We proceed in the same way when asked whether the Skeptic has a system. If
16 one defines a system as an attachment to a number of dogmas that agree with
one another and with appearances, and defines a dogma as an assent to something
non-evident, we shall say that the Skeptic does not have a system. But if one says
that a system is a way of life that, in accordance with 17 appearances, follows a
certain rationale, where that rationale shows how it is possible to seem to live
rightly (“rightly” being taken, not as referring only to virtue, but in a more
ordinary sense) and tends to produce the disposition to suspend judgment, then we
say that he does have a system. For we do follow a certain rationale that, in accord
with appearances, points us toward a life in conformity with the customs of our
country and its laws and institutions, and with our own particular pathé.
9. Does the Skeptic Theorize about Nature?
We reply in the same vein if asked whether the Skeptic needs to theorize about
18 nature. On the one hand, if there is a question of making an assertion with firm
confidence about any of the matters dogmatically treated in physical theory, we
do not theorize; but, on the other hand, in the course of opposing to every
statement an equal statement, and in connection with ataraxia, we do touch upon
physical theory. This, too, is the way we approach the logical and ethical parts of
so-called “philosophy.”
10. Do the Skeptics Deny Appearances?
Those who claim that the Skeptics deny appearances seem to me not to have 19
heard what we say. For, as we stated above, we do not reject the things that lead
us involuntarily to assent in accord with a passively received phantasia, and these
are appearances. And when we question whether the external object *92* is such
as it appears, we grant that it does appear, and we are not raising a question about
the appearance but rather about what is said about the appearance; this is different
from raising a question about the appearance itself. 20 For example, the honey
appears to us to be sweet. This we grant, for we sense the sweetness. But whether
it is sweet we question insofar as this has to do with the [philosophical] theory, for
that theory is not the appearance, but something said about the appearance. And
even when we do present arguments in opposition to the appearances, we do not
put these forward with the intention of denying the appearances but by way of
pointing out the precipitancy of the Dogmatists; for if the theory is so deceptive as
to all but snatch away the appearances from under our very eyes, should we not
distrust it in regard to the non-evident, and thus avoid being led by it into
precipitate judgments?
11. The Criterion of the Skeptic Way
That we hold to the appearances is obvious from what we say about the
criterion of the Skeptic Way. The word “criterion” is used in two ways: first, for
the criterion that is assumed in connection with belief about existence or nonexistence,
and that we shall discuss in our objections; and second, for the criterion
of action, by attention to which in the conduct of daily life we do some 22 things
and not others; it is of the latter that we are now speaking. Accordingly, we say
that the criterion of the Skeptic Way is the appearance – in effect using that term
here for the phantasia – for since this appearance lies in feeling and involuntary
pathos it is not open to question. Thus nobody, I think, disputes about whether the
external object appears this way or that, but rather about whether it is such as it
appears to be.
Holding to the appearances, then, we live without beliefs but in accord with
the ordinary regimen of life, since we cannot be wholly inactive. And this
ordinary regimen of life seems to be fourfold: one part has to do with the guidance
of nature, another with the compulsion of the pathé, another with the handing
down of laws and customs, and a fourth with instruction in arts and 24 crafts.
Nature’s guidance is that by which we are naturally capable of sensation and
thought; compulsion of the pathé is that by which hunger drives us to food and
thirst makes us drink; the handing down of customs and laws is that by which we
accept that piety in the conduct of life is good and impiety bad; and instruction in
arts and crafts is that by which we are not inactive in whichever of these we
acquire. And we say all these things without belief.
12. What Is the Goal of Skepticism?
After these remarks, our next task is to explain the goal of the Skeptic Way.
Now the goal or end is that for the sake of which everything is done or
considered, while it, in turn, is not done or considered for the sake of anything
else; or, it is the ultimate object of the desires. We always say that as regards
belief the Skeptic’s goal is ataraxia, and that as regards things that are 26
unavoidable it is having moderate pathè. For when the Skeptic set out to *93*
philosophize with the aim of assessing his phantasiai – that is, of determining
which are true and which are false so as to achieve ataraxia – he landed in a
controversy between positions of equal strength, and, being unable to resolve it,
he suspended judgment. But while he was thus suspending judgment there 27
followed by chance the sought-after ataraxia as regards belief. For the person
who believes that something is by nature good or bad is constantly upset; when he
does not possess the things that seem to be good, he thinks he is being tormented
by things that are by nature bad, and he chases after the things he supposes to be
good; then, when he gets these, he fails into still more torments because of
irrational and immoderate exultation, and, fearing any change, he does absolutely
everything in order not to lose the things that seem to him 28 good. But the person
who takes no position as to what is by nature good or bad neither avoids nor
pursues intensely. As a result, he achieves ataraxia.
Indeed, what happened to the Skeptic is just like what is told of Apelles the
painter. For it is said that once upon a time, when he was painting a horse and
wished to depict the horse’s froth, he failed so completely that he gave up and
threw his sponge at the picture – the sponge on which he used to wipe the paints
from his brush-and that in striking the picture the sponge produced the desired
effect. So, too, the Skeptics were hoping to achieve ataraxia by 29 resolving the
anomaly of phenomena and noumena, and, being unable to do this, they
suspended judgment. But then, by chance as it were, when they were suspending
judgment the ataraxia followed, as a shadow follows the body. we do not
suppose, of course, that the Skeptic is wholly untroubled, but we do say that he is
troubled only by things unavoidable. For we agree that sometimes he is-cold and
thirsty and has various feelings like those. But even in such cases, 30 whereas
ordinary people are affected by two circumstances – namely by the pathé
themselves and not less by its seeming that these conditions are by nature bad –
the Skeptic, by eliminating the additional belief that all these things are naturally
bad, gets off more moderately here as well. Because of this we say that as regards
belief the Skeptic’s goal is ataraxia, but in regard to things unavoidable it is
having moderate pathé. But some notable Skeptics have added “suspension of
judgment during investigations” to these.
13. The General Modes of Epoché
Since we have been saying that ataraxia follows on suspending judgment
about 31 everything, the next thing would be to explain how we reach this
suspension. Roughly speaking, one may say that it comes about through the
opposition of things. We oppose phenomena to phenomena or noumena to
noumena, or alternando. For instance, we oppose phenomena to phenomena when
we say 32 that the same tower appears round from a distance but square from close
up; and noumena to noumena when, in reply to one who infers the existence of
divine providence from the order of the heavenly bodies, we oppose the fact that
often the good fare ill and the bad fare well, and deduce from this that divine
providence does not exist; and noumena to phenomena, as when 33 Anaxagoras
argued, in opposition to snow’s being white, that snow is frozen *94* water and
water is dark in color, and therefore snow is dark in color. Or, with a different
concept of opposition, we sometimes oppose present things to present things, as in
the foregoing examples, and sometimes present things to things past or to things
future; for example, when somebody brings up an 34 argument that we are not able
to refute, we say to him: “Just as before the birth of the person who introduced the
system which you follow, the argument supporting that system did not yet appear
sound although it really was, so also it is possible that the opposite of the
argument you now advance is really sound despite its not yet appearing so to us,
and hence we should not yet assent to this argument that now seems so strong.” 35
But in order that we may more accurately understand these oppositions, I shall set
down the modes or arguments by means of which suspension of judgment is
brought about, without, however, maintaining anything about their number or
their force. For they may well be unsound, and there may be more than the ones I
shall mention.
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